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A NEW ERA IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Referring to the internationalization of law, in 2001 Schwartz declared: “we are in 
the midst of creating a constitution for the entire world.”1 While it is unclear whether 
it can in fact be said that the world is moving towards such a supra-national 
constitutional order, it is readily evident that the past twenty-five years have 
witnessed the emergence of a more integrated and authoritative international socio-
economic infrastructure that requires deeper civic engagement on a truly global 
scale.  In the words of former Supreme Court Justice Bastarache, 
“internationalization of the law” in Canada is a “bottom up exercise” whereby 
“universal values reflecting a commonality of objectives facilitates a certain form of 
harmonization”.2  This conception of what some scholars have termed the “selective 
adaptation”3 of international law demands, first and foremost, that the requirements 
of trade be subordinated to those of fundamental justice and to the sovereignty of 
democratic peoples. For Clarkson, while in many respects unjust and unfair, the rules 
and rulings of supranational private arbiters represent an “external constitution” 
since “they prevail over domestic legislative or administrative powers [and] because 
they cannot be amended by domestic democratic processes or law and regulation 
making”.4 
 
 
Although both the modern system of international trade law and the 
international human rights regime emerged in the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War, as Biukovic asserts, “the two systems appear to be completely separate 
even though both have the same normative underpinnings—those associated with the 
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UNBLJ 190 at 191.  
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Western ideas of liberal democratic capitalism”.5 More accurately, perhaps, both 
regimes highlight a longstanding tension in modern democracies between liberty and 
equality interests and the need to situate liberal aims within a broader social justice 
framework. As Bronckers asks, “does the principle of better market access always 
prevail, or do other objectives (such as the protection of intellectual property, or of 
the environment) carry equal weight?”6 Although the nation state occupies a key 
position in international law, when states fail to pursue democratic aims the 
internationalization of legal authority does not necessarily create a more 
representative international legal system.  Likewise, although recent decades have 
witnessed a distinct proliferation of NGOs at the international level, as many NGOs 
have little connection with popular interests, their spread does not necessarily 
translate into a more democratic or inclusive legal order. A central question, 
therefore, concerns “the accountability effects on the global regulatory agency of 
civil society involvement, or, in other words, how citizen group interventions have 
and have not advanced transparency, consultation, evaluation and redress in respect 
of the global regulatory agency concerned…and filled the gaps left by those other 
channels”.7  
 
 
The incremental advancement of public international law represents the 
efforts of lobbyists, international law scholars, legal professionals, and members of 
international legal organizations, a community that is often uniquely and expertly 
trained.  Unfortunately, many domestic courts often lack the expertise of 
international experts who could provide guidance on international law in an efficient, 
inexpensive, and competent manner.8 While the conventional theory of 
accountability assumes that states are alone responsible for the well-being of their 
citizens and for safeguarding their own autonomy, this model is quickly becoming 
antiquated. Realistically, many developing or non-democratic nation states are either 
unable or unwilling to put the interests of citizens at the forefront of global trade 
negotiations, just as multilateral treaties and forums can be dominated by a small 
number of powerful “first world” states.9  Compounding this democratic deficit at 
the international level is the increasing separation of trade-related forums and laws 
from the international legal system.  
 
 
5 Biukovic, supra note 3 at 169. 
6 M. Bronckers, “Better Rules for a new Millennium: A Warning Against Undemocratic Developments in 
the WTO” (1999) 2 J Int’l Econ L 547 at 566.  
7 Jan Aart Scholte, “Global Governance, Accountability and Civil Society” in Jan Aart Scholte, ed, 
Building Global Democracy?: Civil Society and Accountable Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011) 8 at 41.  
8 Ian Brownlie, Basic Documents in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 51. 
9 Scholte, supra note 7 at 27.  
                                                        
[2014]                                      IN FROM THE COLD                                             159 
  
Another problem is simply that much contemporary concern over human 
rights has failed to recognize the importance of democratic rights.  This emphasis on 
democratic principles as a central aspect of international human rights can be found 
in Article 1(2) of the Charter of the United Nations, which provides that one of the 
purposes of the United Nations (UN) is “To develop friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples”.10 As noted in Article 21 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
voting rights are a vital human right. Moreover, they are rights that, like freedom of 
expression, ensure that state governments respect and foster an environment that is 
generally more conducive to the creation of rights cultures.  These two documents 
are well established as important sources of international law, meaning that these 
provisions should be given careful consideration by jurists and scholars alike. 
Further expression of a democratic human right can be found in Article 1 of both the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which refer to the 
right of peoples to “freely determine their political status”.  Similarly, Article 25 of 
the ICCPR provides that “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity…To 
take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives”.  While Article 25 has been very broadly interpreted, especially 
during the Cold War era, it does reflect an important regard for representative 
democratic principles whose time may have finally arrived.11  
 
 
While the link between free trade and democracy is often viewed as being 
integral to neoliberal ideologies, it is also a potential site of strategic convergence for 
human rights advocates and proponents of international trade.  If state agreement and 
internal ratification is seen as an important requirement for the application of 
international conventions, and democratic rights are important human rights, then 
why have we not extended the notion of popular sovereignty as an element of a 
signatory’s consent, particularly where an agreement has a direct effect upon the 
scope of the state’s sovereign power? Careful scrutiny of what Harrington terms “a 
treaty’s democratic credentials”12 must become commonplace for elected 
representatives and members of the judiciary alike. Not only is there no obligation 
for executives to consult legislatures, even when entering into treaties that impose 
10 J N Maogoto, “Democratic Governance: An Emerging  Customary Norm?” (2003) 5 University of 
Notre Dame Australian Law Review 55 at 70. 
11 Additional support for an emerging democratic norm can be found in Article 3 of Protocol I of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights, as 
well as the writings of prominent international law scholars. See S Varayudej, “A Right to Democracy in 
International Law: Its implications for Asia” (2006) 12 Ann Surv Int’l & Comp L 1 at 6.  
12 J Harrington, “Redressing the Democratic Deficit in Treaty Law Making: (Re-) Establishing a Role for 
Parliament” (2005) 50 McGill LJ 465 at 508.  
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permanent changes in domestic law, but there are also longstanding common law 
presumptions of conformity with international conventions.13   
 
 
There is a deeply disconcerting jurisdictional and legitimization problem 
with the World Trade Organization (WTO) Treaty and its impact upon domestic 
legal systems.  The WTO Treaty resembles an agreement that is partial in the sense 
that it has never quite fully been understood by the constituents—and perhaps too 
often the legislatures—of its nation members, and because it has incongruously 
defined itself as both a legal agreement between nations and as a quasi-legal body in 
terms of its dispute resolution process that does not take full account of other sources 
of international law. Integration, then, requires that courts and legislatures bring the 
executive to task by fully scrutinizing the domestic effect of the WTO Treaty and the 
international legal obligations that the agreement has created that may have serious 
implications for parliamentary sovereignty.  Likewise, the WTO needs to recognize 
that the only way for it to overcome this legitimization problem is by making itself 
more transparent, more representative, and by respecting and considering broader 
principles of human rights. As Trachtman reminds us, whether or not integration 
between trade and other important issues is desirable is determined by the simple 
issue of utility:  
 
The general issue raised by most linkage claims is whether trade rules and 
environmental, labor, human rights, or other nontrade rules should 
somehow be combined at the WTO in a different way than they now are. 
The fundamental basis for responding to such a question is welfare, 
broadly understood: does it make individuals, in the aggregate, better off 
to do so?14 
 
 
To such an end, less than a decade ago Cass Sunstein wrote about what he 
termed “incompletely theorized agreements”: agreements that are made even when 
parties have very different views but share common goals and interests.15  
Incomplete theorization often allows progress and compromise to be made on 
problems that would otherwise appear to be intractable and irresolvable.16  Rather 
than arguing about abstract differences, parties focus on achieving compromises that 
are both possible and mutually advantageous. While incomplete theorization can be a 
problem if, for example, one is talking about an institution that fails to have some 
13 Ibid.  
14 J Trachtman, “Institutional Linkage: Transcending "Trade and ..." (2002) 96 AJIL 77 at 77. 
15 C R Sunstein, "Incompletely Theorized Agreements" (1995), 108 Harv L Rev 1733.  
16 A S Desai, “Libertarian Paternalism, Externalities, and the ‘Spirit of Liberty’: How Thaler and Sunstein 
are Nudging Us Toward an ‘Overlapping Consensus’” (2011) 36 Law and Social Inquiry 263.   
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distinct institution identity,17 incompletely theorized agreements are particularly 
advantageous where consensus is necessary for both parties, compromise has 
otherwise been difficult to achieve, and stakes are relatively high.  Sunstein 
distinguishes between three types of incompletely theorized agreements: i) 
incompletely specified agreements (e.g., “constitutional provisions and regulatory 
standards in administrative law”); ii) mid-tier incompletely theorized agreements 
where there is “agreement on a mid-level principle” but disagreement “about the 
more general theory that accounts for it and about outcomes in a particular case”; 
and iii) “incompletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes, accompanied by 
agreements on the low-level principles that account for them”.18 According to 
Sunstein, incompletely theorized agreements offer a number of practical advantages, 
including “the facilitation of convergence, the reduction of costs of disagreement and 
the demonstration of humility and mutual respect…[and] are especially well adapted 
to a system that must take precedents as fixed points”.19  
 
 
In examining the institutional shortcomings of the WTO and what has been 
called its current “legitimization crisis”, this paper will illustrate that it is both 
expedient and permissible for the WTO framework to incorporate a higher degree of 
respect for democratic norms and human rights, and that is likewise necessary for 
domestic courts and legislatures to attempt to come to terms with the nature and 
effect of the WTO Agreement on domestic institutions and laws.  If the dismantling 
of the entire international financial system and supranational bodies such as the 
WTO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank is unlikely, then 
efforts aimed at creating tangible democratic gains through incompletely theorized 
agreements may be a sensible form of compromise. Similarly, supporters of the 
WTO have already acknowledged the need for enhanced legitimacy just as many 
trade advocates are committed to the principles of democratic governance and free 
markets. There is, simply speaking, too much at stake for both trade advocates and 
human rights proponents to ignore the need for a deeper, more representative 
consensus.  
 
 
Unfortunately, although we see evidence of convergence in both the realms 
of public international law and international trade law, there appears to be little 
strategic consolidation or dialogue between the latter two emerging spheres.  Instead, 
the Canadian legal system has failed to fully articulate the place of the WTO Treaty 
as a unique aspect of international law within the domestic legal system.  
Consequently, Sunstein’s notion of incompletely theorized agreements provides a 
17 Y Bathaee,  "Incompletely Theorized Agreements: An Unworkable Theory of Judicial Modesty" (2007) 
34: 5 Fordham Urb LJ 1457.  
18 Sunstein, supra note 15 at 1739-1740. 
19 Sunstein, supra note 15 at 1761.   
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useful model for considering the need for convergence and consolidation of the trade 
framework, which appears to be state-centric, and the human rights framework, 
which is moving towards a more global and less state-centric model of public 
international law.  International trade law cannot solely rely on treaties whose 
legitimacy depends on state sovereignty since it most often represents the interests of 
corporations and other non-state actors. Likewise, international human rights law 
cannot ignore the growing power and influence of international trade law if its 
proponents are to create a truly global and effective international rights regime. 
Convergence can thus be accomplished by integration from above by the decision-
making bodies of international human rights organizations and trade organizations, 
as well as from below within democratic states that insist that international trade 
agreements respect human rights and are negotiated and ratified in a transparent, 
open, and democratic manner.  
 
 
THE WTO: A CASE STUDY IN FAILED INTEGRATION  
 
The Expanding Jurisdiction of the WTO  
 
Why should Canadians be concerned about the WTO? As Krueger points out, “the 
WTO is the legal and institutional foundation of the multilateral trading system. It is 
not a best endeavors organization”.20 While citizens formulated many of the 
constitutions of classic liberal democracies, to date there has been little popular input 
into the creation and governance of supra-national organizations such as the WTO. 
Although the WTO has expanded its jurisdiction to include issues related to the 
environment,21 culture, telecommunications, and intellectual property, the 
agreements that collectively define the WTO framework have failed to reflect a deep 
sense of the importance and relevance of human rights and democratic norms.  
Public anger over the perceived inequality and anti-democratic nature of the WTO 
system was all too evident during such ugly incidents as the well-known protests in 
Seattle, Genoa, Washington, Madrid, and Paris.  Some of the most contentious 
provisions of the WTO system include the principle of non-discrimination and, in 
particular, most-favored nation status, which dictates that any tariff reduction or 
advantage offered to a single country or trading partner must be offered to all.  
 
 
Moreover, WTO decisions on issues related to the environment, farm 
subsidies, the regulation of pharmaceuticals, and the treatment of developing 
20 A Krueger, The WTO as an International Organization. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998) at 
32. 
21 Trachtman, supra note 14.  
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countries have all been controversial.22  Generally, critics have drawn careful 
attention to the significant limitations the WTO Agreement places on domestic 
jurisdiction over trade, the Agreement’s wide-ranging surveillance over domestic 
governments and bodies that administer trade policy, and the degree to which the 
Agreement “overrides domestic legislation enacted to preserve…cultural values, 
environmental resources, and labor standards”.23  The WTO, in this respect, is not 
your typical international organization since it is unique in 
 
the extent to which [it has] diverged from [its] original State-centered 
modes of operation and [has], instead, sought legitimacy from, and 
accountability to, a wide variety of international stake holders, as well as 
pursuing goals and embracing values that might be divergent from the 
interests of many (if not most) States.24 
 
Also rare in this regard is the ability of the WTO to effect compliance without having 
to rely upon enforcement mechanisms within the state itself.25 In this sense, its 
consistent failure to situate its regulatory framework within the international legal 
system is surprising, given its demonstrated ability to create a relatively internally 
coherent and comprehensive set of dispute resolution procedures, rules, and norms 
for resolving member disputes.  
 
 
In terms of its ability to regulate international trade, then, the WTO is a 
remarkably effective body. According to Moore, the WTO “provides an answer to 
perhaps the central political question of our time: how to manage a globalizing world 
when democracy remains rooted in the nation-state”.26 This is significant, given that 
the WTO in many ways represents a partial devolution of democratic sovereignty 
without extensive democratic consultation. There is no analogous international 
organization that restricts trade in furtherance of international democracy or rights.  
Broader participation requires that citizens and legislatures understand the full nature 
of international trade agreements before they are signed.27 In a truly accountable 
international legal order, “Responsibility means that WTO negotiators have to ensure 
that parliaments, citizens, and companies can verify beforehand what the 
22 Marc Williams, “Civil society and the WTO: Contesting accountability” in Jan Aart Scholte, ed, 
Building Global Democracy?: Civil Society and Accountable Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011) 105 at 128.  
23 Ibid, at 111-12. 
24 David J Bederman, Globalization and International Law (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) at 
156.  
25 Ibid.   
26 M Moore, “The WTO’s First Decade” (2005) 4 World Trade Review 3, 359 at 359. 
27 M Bronckers,  “Better Rules for a new Millennium: A Warning Against Undemocratic Developments in 
the WTO” (1999) 2 J Int’l Econ L 547-566.   
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implications of WTO rules are”.28  Even beyond that, “this is a minimum 
requirement, now that the WTO is transforming itself from a trade and customs 
organization to an organization that is increasingly occupied with domestic policy 
issues such as the environment, public health, investments, and the commercial 
behavior of companies”.29 Although Moore traces the origin of the WTO to post-war 
reconstruction efforts and links its creation to that of the IMF, the World Bank, and 
the UN, in matter of fact it is much more like the first two organizations than the 
third.30   
 
 
Despite its effectiveness and growing power, the nature of the inter-
relationship between national laws and the jurisdiction of the WTO is not entirely 
clear. According to Beaulac, a prominent Canadian legal scholar, “The structural 
conception of the relation between international law and domestic law in Canada is 
essentially dualist; indeed, the two systems are not, in any real sense, part of an 
integrated legal order, one that would fall within a monist logic”.31  Yet, despite the 
essentially dualist conceptual model used by the Canadian judiciary, WTO panels 
and the WTO Appellate Body essentially operate within a monist framework. A 
recent example of the scope of WTO jurisdiction is the panel decision in EC – Seal 
Products to uphold a European Union ban on seal products on the ground of the 
“public moral concern” exception. This decision was not favorably received by 
Canada and Norway, but demonstrates that existing exceptions can be utilized to 
create a more equitable and democratic balance of powers within the present regime. 
Despite the traditional inter-state conception of international law that emphasizes 
managing conflict among sovereign nations, “international trade law, like 
international environmental law and international human rights law, are part of this 
international law of cooperation”.32  Indeed, in 1996, the WTO Appellate Body in 
US—Gasoline ruled that the provisions of the WTO Agreement itself permitted 
consideration of public international law,33 and in the Korea—Procurement decision 
of 2000 the Panel Report held that customary international law applied to WTO 
treaties.34  
 
28 Ibid at 566. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Moore, supra note 26 at 365. 
31 Stephanie Beaulac, “International Law Gateway to Domestic Law: Hart’s ‘Open Texture’ Legal 
Language and the Canadian Charter” (2012) 46 RJT 443 at 465. 
32 P Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 61. 
33 Ibid at 63. 
34 P C Mavroidis, “No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practiced by WTO Courts” (2008), 102(3) AJIL 
420 at 436.  
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There are other examples of linkages between WTO law and public 
international law. The WTO Agreement contains provisions that allow for states to 
amend the governing agreement and to adopt interpretations of certain provisions.35 
The Appellate Body and the panels also regularly make reference to the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties in interpreting and applying the provisions of 
WTO Agreements in order to render their decisions, and often rely upon implied 
powers that are necessary to reach a ruling in a given case that is consistent with its 
overall mandate.36 In US—Wool Shirts and Blouses, the Appellate Body also adopted 
a general principle of law regarding the burden of proof required to reach a finding,37 
demonstrating that the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO has begun to function 
more like a general international commercial court than simply a panel for mediating 
party disputes.  Similarly, the General Council and the Ministerial Conference also 
possess the authority to adopt interpretations and is able to exercise broad powers 
within the WTO framework itself.38  
 
 
Like the WTO’s relationship with public international law, the 
interconnection between the institutional mechanisms of the WTO and the legal 
systems of its member states is complex. But there is also an important internal 
aspect to the emergence of international trade law within the public international law 
regime. Most importantly, Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement requires that 
members ensure “conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative 
procedures”,39 while Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) provides that members “shall take such reasonable measures as may be 
available to [them] to ensure observance to the provisions of this Agreement by the 
regional and local governments and authorities within its territories”.40 Likewise, 
domestic courts, as a principle of general application, attempt to interpret domestic 
law in a manner consistent with international treaties that their nation has signed and 
ratified.41 Indeed, the WTO Appellate Body, in India—Patents, ruled that it could 
use domestic law as evidence of a nation’s compliance or non-compliance with the 
TRIPS Agreement,42 while the Panel Report in Argentina—Poultry Anti-Dumping 
Duties specifically noted that domestic law could not override the specific provisions 
35 Ibid at 423. 
36 Ibid at 434. 
37 Ibid at 424. 
38 Ibid at 433. 
39 Article XVI: 4 of the WTO Agreement as cited in Bossche, supra note 32 at 65. 
40 GATT 1994 as cited in Bossche, supra note 32 at 65. 
41 Bossche, supra note 32 at 67. 
42 Ibid.   
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of the WTO Agreements themselves.43  Mechanisms do, therefore, exist for the 
WTO to take human rights and democratic norms into account should it possess the 
will and initiative to do so.  
 
 
Domestic Reception of WTO Rulings and Agreements 
 
What, then, has been the effect of WTO rulings and agreements in Canada? The 
WTO clearly has a direct effect on vital national interests. Canada has lost a number 
of high profile WTO disputes, including EC – Asbestos, Canada—Aircraft, 
Canada—Wheat, Canada—Periodicals, Canada—Patent Term, Canada—
Pharmaceutical Patents, and the Auto Pact Case.44 Yet, according to Brandon, 
despite growing public concern, Canadian courts have been slow to conceptualize 
the nature of the inter-relationship between domestic and international law.45 They 
have, however, emphasized the relevance of international treaties to which Canada is 
a party when interpreting domestic statutes and the scope of Charter rights.  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court of Canada has used unimplemented treaties as an aid to statutory 
interpretation46 in recognition of the presumption that legislatures are assumed to act 
in a manner consistent with international law absent evidence to the contrary.47 
 
 
Charter jurisprudence has been a particularly active site of engagement with 
international law. As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in Slaight Communications 
Inc. v Davidson48 and Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),49 and 
reiterated in R v Keegstra, international human rights law is of particular relevance for 
Canadian courts when determining the content of Charter rights, as well as the nature of 
worthwhile substantial and pressing objectives under s 1.50 However, in Suresh v 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),51 although the Court emphasized 
the relevance of international human rights covenants as establishing a baseline or 
minimal content for related Charter rights, it also stated that these obligations could 
43 Mavroidis, supra note 34 at 467. 
44 J D Krikorian International Trade Law and Domestic Policy: Canada the United States and the WTO 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012) at 196. 
45 E Brandon, “Does International Law Mean Anything in Canadian Courts?” (2011) 11 J Envtl l & Prac 
399.  
46 Ibid at 3. 
47 D.Bassan, “The Canadian Charter and Public International Law” (1996) 34:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 583 at 
593.  See also Brandon, supra note 45. 
48 Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1038, 59 DLR (4th) 416. 
49 Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [1999] 2 SCR 817, 174 DLR (4th) 193. 
50  R v Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697 at 750. 
51 Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 SCR 3.  
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be reasonably limited in exceptional circumstances in accordance with s 1 (the 
balancing analysis that is typically used in assessing breaches of s 7 of the 
Charter).52 Some scholars have argued that s 26 of the Charter allows for the 
incorporation of rights protected by customary international law into Canadian 
domestic law.53 Not surprisingly, in R v Hape,54 the Supreme Court of Canada also 
used customary international law as a relevant consideration in determining the 
reasonable limitations of Charter rights.55 Unlike international treaty law, which 
generally must be adopted by domestic legislatures, customary international law is 
presumed to be a part of the domestic legal system absent a conflicting domestic 
statute or common law rule.56 This is significant since, apart from any incorporation 
by direct reference or any use of international legal instruments as interpretative aids, 
all WTO members are bound by jus cogens regardless of whether such principles are 
directly referenced or incorporated.57  
 
 
Unfortunately, the active use of international law in Charter jurisprudence 
has not given rise to any deep engagement with the issue of the effect of Canadian 
human rights commitments or of Canada’s democratic rights and its obligations 
under the WTO Treaty.  The treatment of international law by domestic courts takes 
on special dimensions once it is recognized that “individuals actually are the holders 
of international rights without being international persons”.58 Generally, Canadian 
courts have relied on a dualist model of international law to treat the issue as one of 
jurisdiction rather than as a problem related to democratic or human rights. In Pfizer 
Inc. v Canada (T.D.),59 the Federal Court held that, like any other international 
treaty, the WTO Agreement did not become part of Canadian law until it was ratified 
by the Parliament of Canada.60 While the court noted that executive action must be 
constitutional, this fact could not give rise to a right of action for private parties 
under the World Trade Organization Agreement Implementation Act where none 
would otherwise exist.61 Likewise, in R v Cook,62 the Supreme Court of Canada 
considered the relevance of the customary norm of international law regarding the 
52 J H Currie, Public International Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) at 260. 
53 Ibid at 590. 
54 R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26 at 1, [2007] 2 SCR 292 [Hape]. 
55 Currie, supra note 52 at 261. 
56 Bassan, supra note 47 at 587. 
57 Mavroidis, supra note 34 at 426. 
58 R Portman, International Personality in International Law, (New York: Cambridge Press, 2010) at 11. 
59 Pfizer Inc v Canada (TD), [1999] 4 FC 441 [Pfizer].  
60 Brandon, supra note 45 at 7. 
61 Ibid. 
62 R v Cook, [1998] 2 SCR 597.  
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sovereignty of states.63 While the majority considered the customary norm of 
international law that protected state sovereignty, Justice Bastarache, writing in 
obiter, expressed a general reluctance to allowing international legal norms and 
standards to limit a domestic Charter right.64   
 
 
This begs the question of whose interests are relevant in determining the 
utility of such agreements and who gets to make such a decision. Such complexities 
are compounded by recent decisions underscoring the importance of parliamentary 
intention when applying international treaties domestically. In Pfizer,65 the Federal 
Court found that the World Trade Organization Agreement Implementation Act had 
not been fully enacted domestically as an integral part of Canadian law since this 
required the clear and unequivocal consent of Parliament and, for matters falling 
within provincial jurisdiction, the consent of the provinces.  This was so despite the 
fact that the federal government holds both the treaty-making power and, pursuant to 
s 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, jurisdiction over trade and commerce.  The 
Federal Court’s strict interpretation of the enactment of the World Trade 
Organization Agreement Implementation Act is encouraging, especially given that 
private citizens are prohibited from bringing claims under both this Act and the 
WTO Agreement. Pfizer reminds us that there are some problematic issues 
associated with the domestic implementation of the WTO Agreement that need to be 
viewed in relation to the very real pressures imposed upon legislatures by executives 
exercising their prerogative to enter into binding international agreements.  A similar 
democratic deficit has been recognized at the international level by those who have 
voiced concerned about the relative lack of dialogue between human rights discourse 
and trade liberalization discourse.   
 
 
As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in Reference re Secession of 
Quebec, constitutional supremacy implies a whole range of obligations related to 
popular sovereignty and the rule of law, and further requires that the principle of 
popular democracy be given due consideration even where its legal effect is less than 
clear. In this way, arguments for protecting and promoting democratic rights mirror 
those aimed at fostering economic self sufficiency: by ensuring autonomy and 
viability at the local level, the potential for self-help is enhanced.  Unfortunately, to 
date, as Kelsen notes, conventional international law is concerned primarily with the 
efficacy of a government within a state as opposed to its commitment to any 
democratic principles or values.66 Although, in Pfizer, the Federal Court explicitly 
rejected the argument that the rule of law should be used to strike down provisions of 
63 Currie, supra note 52 at 261. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Pfizer at 441. 
66 Kelsen, as cited in Maogoto, supra note 10 at 56.  
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the World Trade Organization Agreement Implementation Act that prohibit such 
actions, in its interpretation of the patent claim before it the Court narrowly 
described the WTO Agreements as “matters of public law involving public rights, 
not matters of private economic or commercial rights” and held that “the rule of law 
[that] requires that all government action comply with the Constitution” could not be 
“interpreted as a sword to strike down sections 5 and 6 of the WTO Implementation 
Act”.67 
 
 
Pfizer illustrates the fact that the prevailing dualist model of international 
law fails to recognize the far-reaching nature of the WTO Agreement, as well as the 
increasing need to hold the executive accountable to existing constitutional 
frameworks to reflect a growing tendency to encourage democratic rights and values 
at the international level.  While the Court imposes an analysis that relies heavily on 
the division of powers between the executive and legislative branches, and suggests 
that barring individual claims under the WTO Agreement allows the executive to 
operate efficiently in foreign affairs, it gives no consideration to how these 
Agreements effect the rule of law and the other democratic principles articulated in 
the Quebec Secession Reference.  It is perhaps somewhat fitting that in Pfizer we see 
the Court make a ruling that can be narrowly construed as being applicable to 
corporate rights, but that has broader implications for democracy and the rule of 
law—an all too common theme with respect to WTO-related jurisprudence.  
 
 
LEGISLATURES, INTEGRATION AND THE WTO AT INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
 
To what extent, then, does the WTO’s growing jurisdiction represent a challenge to 
parliamentary sovereignty? First of all, it is important to remember that, unlike many 
international agreements, the WTO Treaty is a comprehensive and far-reaching 
international agreement that imposes very real obligations on member states. 
Specifically, it imposes a general system of administrative oversight and trade 
liberalization that is legally binding upon all member states. As Clarkson points out, 
“In the international domain, a tremendous imbalance characterizes the disparity 
between the authoritative, hard-law nature of the WTO’s economic rules and the 
hortatory, soft-law character of most other multilateral agreements”.68  The WTO 
panels have maintained that although their decisions, per se, do not create a binding 
precedent, this does not mean that the cases and decisions of WTO adjudicating 
bodies do not constitute an influential body of jurisprudence in its own right,69 or 
perhaps even a potential emerging body of customary law.  Indeed, having legal 
67 Pfizer at paras 59 – 61. 
68 Clarkson, supra note 4 at 258. 
69 Mavroidis, supra note 34 at 464.  
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personality, the WTO General Council itself has treaty-making power and has 
entered into international agreements with the IMF, the World Bank, the World 
Intellectual Property Organization, and the World Organization for Animal Health.70 
  
 
While the WTO does represent a substantial shift in state practice with 
respect to commercial matters, its effects are mitigated in many respects by a variety 
of internal and external limitations. The fact that the WTO is itself the creation of 
state agreement also means that states remain capable of amending these multilateral 
agreements. While the WTO Treaty is relatively robust in terms of the tools and 
mechanisms that it places at the WTO’s disposal, the WTO panels and decision-
making bodies lack the ability to impose damages or to order specific performance.  
The GATT 1994 does include specific exceptions from the GATT general 
liberalization requirements, provided that the legislative measures are necessary to 
promote a specific policy objective in relation to a certain limited number of 
categorical restrictions, and provided that they are not disguised restraints on trade: 
public health, the environment, “public morals”, national security, and measures 
necessary to protect non-renewable natural resources. Of course, WTO members 
remain perfectly capable of contracting out of any customary international law, 
except for jus cogens.71   
 
 
Despite this, however, the WTO Agreements are silent as to whether its 
rulings are meant to have direct effect within each national jurisdiction,72 ensuring 
that the means by which compliance is attained is left within a particular state’s 
prerogative. International agreements like the WTO Treaty reflect a further 
contradiction: namely, they purport to derive their authority from state consent and 
yet they represent a major trend towards globalization and the denigration of 
democratic state authority, particularly the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.  
This is partly because, generally speaking, the judiciary will often accord the 
executive fair latitude in its conduct of international affairs, not infrequently calling 
on its representatives to provide “evidence” regarding contentious international 
matters.73 As Brandon emphasizes:  
 
The notion of parliamentary sovereignty also has consequences for treaty 
implementation in Canada. Whereas the executive is responsible for 
representing Canada's interests in the negotiation, signature and 
ratification of a treaty, traditionally it has been the role of the legislature to 
give a treaty its domestic effect.  As Rosenberg, J.A. of the Ontario Court 
70 Mavroidis, supra note 34 at 435. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Bosche, supra note 32 at 70. 
73 Brownlie, supra note 8 at 50.  
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of Appeal notes in his dissenting judgment in Ahani v Canada (Attorney 
General), this principle exists ‘to protect Parliament and the people of 
Canada from executive action.’74  
 
  
 While the conventional dualist position on the incorporation of international 
law does provide some protection for the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, it 
does nothing to prevent the executive from binding the state though agreements that 
have far-reaching effects.  Reliance upon such a model, coupled with a lack of 
transparency and complex multilateral agreements on important areas of legislative 
jurisdiction, can create a very confusing, ineffective, and, some might say, 
destabilizing state of affairs. As the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada 
emphasized in R v Hape, Parliament retains the authority to contravene its 
international obligations should it see fit: 
 
Despite the Court’s silence in some recent cases, the doctrine of adoption 
has never been rejected in Canada. Indeed, there is a long line of cases in 
which the Court has either formally accepted it or at least applied it. In my 
view, following the common law tradition, it appears that the doctrine of 
adoption operates in Canada such that prohibitive rules of customary 
international law should be incorporated into domestic law in the absence 
of conflicting legislation. The automatic incorporation of such rules is 
justified on the basis that international custom, as the law of nations, is 
also the law of Canada unless, in a valid exercise of its sovereignty, 
Canada declares that its law is to the contrary. Parliamentary sovereignty 
dictates that a legislature may violate international law, but that it must do 
so expressly. Absent an express derogation, the courts may look to 
prohibitive rules of customary international law to aid in the interpretation 
of Canadian law and the development of the common law.75  
  
This is a strong endorsement of state sovereignty, one that does not seem to mesh 
well with commentators who are concerned about the power of international legal 
trade organizations. However, it is important to remember that there is very little 
judicial consideration of WTO provisions, and even less overt legislative debate on 
its influence and jurisdiction. As Biancardi asserts, “the paradox of state power in 
pursuit of goals whose consequences serve partly to limit its future scope of action 
may seem stark but it is not uncommon…it is only paradoxical if one takes the 
primary goal of states to be the maximization of autonomy”.76 In reality, however, 
“such an approach would miss the salience of democracy precisely because it 
assumes that those who control the state simply reflect the interests and desires of the 
people as a whole”.77 
74 Brandon, supra note 45 at 5. 
75 Hape at para.39. 
76 F Biancardi, Democracy and the global system (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) at 166.  
77 Ibid.   
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For all these reasons, a principled form of integration is necessary in order 
to achieve a form of coherence at the international level, even as the domestic legal 
system seeks to fulfill its role in overseeing the actions of the executive to protect 
fundamental democratic principles. Whereas domestic judges have ignored the issue 
of popular sovereignty and the delegation of democratic authority at the national 
level, WTO decision-making bodies have begun to consider these issues out of 
concern for their own legitimacy and questions of political expediency. The concern 
is that such forms of soft authoritarianism represent an undesirable incrementalism 
and eventually a deep change in international legal regimes, one paralleled by a 
disconcerting unwillingness of national judiciaries to exercise oversight at the 
national level.  This lack of participation is worrisome since “public policy emanates 
from – and accountability correspondingly applies to – complex networks rather than 
one or the other player in isolation”.78 
 
 
Viewed in this context, it is important to consider the complex ways in 
which WTO policy-making bodies integrate important customary norms, such as 
those related to human rights, and contribute to the creation of new norms. The 
integration of domestic and international legal systems must therefore be done in a 
manner that respects existing principles of international law, and the legitimacy of 
formalized legal frameworks.79  To simply impose an artificial unity on the basis of 
formal treaties that fail to reflect more fundamental grounding norms risks creating a 
formal international legal order that lacks legitimacy. Rather, a more democratic 
cooperative project can take shape though “experimental institutional arrangements 
that allow for the egalitarian formulation of cross-sectorial policies based on legal 
procedures, allowing for transparent rule making regarding the most urgent issues at 
stake”.80   
 
 
International institutions like the WTO, therefore, force the international 
community to choose between politics and policy and a more formal regime of 
international legal arrangements.  The demand for consistency and predictability 
within international trade law as it currently exists cannot be fairly reconciled with 
its desire to enhance its perceived legitimacy by incorporating the remainder of 
public international law without deep changes in one—or both—of these two 
systems.  While conceived largely in isolation from international publics, and 
domestic legislative and judicial bodies, the process of democraticizing these 
78 Scholte, supra note 7 at 19. 
79 J Bernstorff, The public international law theory of Hans Kelsen: Believing in universal law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
80 Ibid at 267.  
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formalized legal relationships is also closely related to the need for more engaged 
publics within the international sphere. As Clarkson astutely notes, while 
commenting on the need to revisit the type of national and international reforms that 
created a more responsible international order in the wake of the Second World War, 
“Re-establishing symmetry between supranational economic and social governance 
must happen again”.81 More broadly speaking, “The role of international law in this 
vein would also be to reconnect global rule to national publics through new 
institutional procedures, for unless that happens, executive global rule making 
remains isolated from non-institutionalized local and national discursive 
structures”.82  
 
 
WTO LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS AT INTERNATIONAL 
LAW  
 
What types of problems, then, lie at the heart of the WTO’s legitimization crisis? 
The relative fairness and the practical effect of formal legal relationships are central 
to much of the concern regarding the representativeness of the WTO regime. As 
Giroux and Giroux caution, “transnational in scope, neoliberalism now imposes its 
economic regime and market values on developing weaker nations through structural 
adjustment policies enforced by powerful financial institutions such as the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO)”.83 The WTO Agreements have themselves been passed by Parliament and 
the World Trade Organization Agreement Implementation Act explicitly states that 
WTO rulings have no effect on internal legislation unless specifically enacted.  Yet 
the Appellate Body and the Dispute Settlement Body nonetheless exercise far greater 
powers and, in the words of Jackson, constitute a “supreme court of commercial law” 
that “reach deep inside member’s regulatory systems”.84 Despite this, as Clarkson 
states in his discussion of Mexican and Columbian court decisions that upheld the 
primacy of national constitutions over international treaties, “the fact that the treaties 
were properly negotiated and signed by the…government…did not mean that they 
could trump the constitution’s own supra-legislative norms”.85 Unfortunately, these 
types of decisions have been both infrequent and without much far-reaching effect.  
 
81 Clarkson, supra note 4 at 263,  
82 Bernstorff, supra note 79 at 267. 
83 H Giroux & S Searls Giroux, “Challenging Neoliberalism’s New World Order: The Promise of Critical 
Pedagogy” (2006) 6 Cultural Studies 21 at 23.  
84 Stephen Clarkson, Canada’s Secret Constitution: NAFTA, WTO and the End of Sovereignty? (2 October 
2002) online: Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives   
<http://www.kerri.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National_Office_Pubs/clar
kson_constitution.pd> at 21.  
85 Ibid at 22.  
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At its heart, a legitimization issue requires that formal legal arrangements be 
assessed in terms of both their normative status and their practical real world 
consequences. The legitimacy of the WTO is a question that runs much deeper than 
the democratic and human rights records of the nation state signatories of the WTO 
Agreement, and relates to the legitimacy of constitutional devolutions of sovereignty. 
The notion that the jurisdiction and decisions of the WTO can simply be prescribed 
by its member states ignores the issue of the domestic legitimacy of those 
delegations of authority and any potential conflict that might exist with human rights 
conventions and preemptory norms. Although such coordinated state actions can, 
over time, create new norms, the existing countervailing human rights norms are 
deeply entrenched and cannot simply be disregarded. This has two implications: 
namely that trade law cannot be considered in isolation from all other aspects of 
international law, but also that international trade conventions must respect existing 
human rights obligations.  Important in this regard is the possibility that there exists 
an emerging customary norm of international law in favor of democratic governance.  
As explained by Marks:  
 
The move to reconsider international law’s approach to constitutions in the 
light of political changes was initiated by Thomas Franck. In a path-
breaking article published in 1992, Franck advanced the contention that a 
‘norm of democratic governance’ (or ‘right to democratic governance’) is 
emerging under international law. His idea was later taken up and refined 
by others, among them Christina Cerna, James Crawford, Gregory Fox, 
and Georg Nolte. The norm these scholars have in mind would imply, in 
the first place, that the legitimacy of governments is judged by 
international—rather than purely national—criteria. Secondly, it would 
entail that those criteria stipulate democracy; that is to say, only 
democratic governments would be accepted as legitimate. And thirdly, it 
would establish that democratic governance is a human right, subject to 
international protection through appropriate procedures and enforcement. 
Conceived in this way, a norm of democratic governance would alter 
received international legal doctrines in a number of fundamental respects. 
Whether a government is recognized for international purposes as the 
representative of the state would depend not just on whether the 
government wielded control over the state’s territory, but on whether it 
was a democratic government. The norm would also modify accepted 
notions of sovereignty. Instead of being tied solely to coercive power, 
sovereignty would become linked to political legitimacy, as it is in 
national contexts. In Fox’s words ‘popular sovereignty’—sovereignty that 
resides with citizens—would replace ‘state sovereignty’—sovereignty that 
resides with states, whether governed with the consent of citizens or not. 
Finally, the norm of democratic governance would challenge assumptions 
about human rights. The notion that internationally recognized human 
rights do not presuppose any particular political system could no longer 
hold. Cerna observes that ‘by becoming a party to a human rights 
instrument, a state agrees to organize itself along democratic lines’. The 
norm would make democratic organization a universal right enforceable  
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against all states, whether or not they have become parties to human rights 
treaties.86 
 
It is not clear that this norm, even if it can be said to exist, entails the right to have 
democratic supranational organizations. It might entail some degree of transparency 
and accountability or, as Marks herself has argued,87 an international principle of 
democratic inclusion that could mandate a certain minimal degree of transparency, 
representativeness, and accountability to democratic states depending on the nature 
of the affected interests. It simply might require that existing treaties and customary 
norms be interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with democratic principles 
such as that of popular sovereignty.  
 
 
What, then, would be the value of integrating democratic rights and norms 
into the WTO framework? One reason to use these provisions to interpret other 
international laws is the fact that, as Pauwelyn has argued, addressing the issue of 
conflicting international norms is central to the viability of the WTO regime. This 
conflict must be addressed not only by international organizations and legal bodies, 
but also by the domestic courts which are charged with determining the applicability 
of international norms and rules within their own countries’ domestic constitutional 
frameworks.88 There is no principle of res judicata that binds either domestic courts 
or international tribunals to follow the decisions of one another.89 However, there is 
also no principle precluding the adoption of an international precedent by a domestic 
court when it is on all fours with the case before it. The advent of the Charter has 
made the Canadian judiciary considerably more cosmopolitan in its outlook, 
particularly with regard to human rights litigation.90    
 
 
Pauwelyn described the need for a broader discussion about the proper role 
of the WTO within the existing international framework by stating, “The WTO treaty 
must be construed and applied in the context of all other international law”.91  Rather 
than being an esoteric area only of interest to those engaged in international trade or 
economic policy making, undoubtedly “WTO law is international law. The WTO is 
not a closed legal circuit”.92 Although the WTO was created by the assent of separate 
86 S Marks. The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of Ideology. 
(Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2000) at 38. 
87 Ibid.  
88 J Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of 
International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
89 Brownlie, supra note 8 at 51. 
90 Bassan, supra note 47.  
91 Pauwelyn, supra note 88 at 492. 
92 Ibid at 52.  
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sovereign states, it has independent personality at international law and is itself a 
source of new law and norms created though panel decisions and state practice. 
Integrating public international law into the WTO framework does not require a 
further widening of the WTO’s mandate, but simply involves having the WTO 
consider international law where necessary to address a given trade issue. More 
principally, international law can “fill gaps or provide interpretative material. But it 
may also overrule WTO norms”.93 “That way”, argues Pauwelyn, “the WTO can 
continue to produce trade norms; other international organizations and conferences 
can produce other types of norms”.94  
 
 
Although Pauwelyn underscores the importance of environmental law, the 
law of treaties, and jus cogens, equal emphasis must be placed on international rights 
and democratic norms. The need for “integration” is also a broader public 
educational aim that reminds us that such institutions, as well as the broader 
international public sphere, must remain open and transparent. The creation of an 
active and engaged international citizenry is doubtlessly a long way off. However, it 
is precisely this type of norm-creating activity which reminds us that international 
law needs to be increasingly popularized through concerted public education 
initiatives in order to counterbalance the narrow interests of private corporations, 
international bureaucrats, and the executive branch of governments within ostensibly 
democratic nation states.   
 
 
THE PROBLEM OF INTEGRATION  
 
Essentially Contested Concepts and Incompletely Theorized Agreements  
 
Is it even realistic to suggest that something can be done about the WTO’s ongoing 
democratic deficit? Although the Vienna Convention On The Law of Treaties 
prohibits a state from relying on “the provisions of its internal law as justification for 
its failure to perform a treaty”,95 the issue of legitimization inevitably arises when 
international agreements that represent a significant devolution of sovereignty are 
not negotiated or signed in a transparent manner. Nonetheless, measures can be taken 
to enhance democratic representativeness short of outright abrogation. As with any 
international agreement, deficiencies can be remedied by renegotiating or amending 
the treaty, by internally curtailing the scope of the treaty through legislative or 
judicial action, or, where the treaty sets up a decision-making process, by 
incorporating the legal principles of transparency and popular sovereignty into the 
legal decisions of the decision-making bodies themselves.  To some extent, all three 
93 Ibid.  
94 Ibid. 
95 Article 27, Vienna Convention, as cited in Bossche, supra note 32 at 61.  
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of these tactics will lead to a more effective integration of domestic law, 
international trade law, and the “remainder” of public international law.   
 
 
The degree to which the WTO is perceived as a threat to democracy 
depends, in part, on whether one sees it as an intergovernmental or a supranational 
organization.96 If the former, then the WTO derives its legitimacy solely from its 
member states who should be presumed to adequately represent their citizens’ 
interests. If the latter, then matters become somewhat more complex and the 
implications for developing a broader framework of civic engagement within 
international law is even more pressing. Unfortunately, as Scholte reminds us, 
despite the lingering influence of the Westphalian model of international law, to date 
individual states—including democracies—have failed to provide rigorous oversight 
of many international treaties and supranational organizations.97 Instead, “only 
extended and weak chains of accountability link state delegates in a global 
governance area to the wider publics that those officials notionally represent”.98  
 
 
The vital issue with regard to delegation is its practical effect and the 
legitimacy of the decisions subsequently made. As Bederman states, “the real 
question is the extent to which decision-making practically shifts from domestic to 
international levels of authority (and back again), and whether there is sufficient 
transparency and accountability of decision-making—at whatever level—so as to 
confer legitimacy on the decisions that are rendered”.99  WTO and NAFTA 
arbitration decisions, and the administrative and regulatory apparatus that has grown 
up around these bodies, are symptomatic of “the de-territorialization and 
privatization of law”— a tendency that has weakened the authority and influence of 
modern democracies and further heightened the vast influence of corporate power.100 
Even within the conventional Westphalian model, for example, amendments to the 
WTO Agreement permitting waivers for bilateral or multilateral agreements between 
states for issues relating to human rights or the environment would be one means of 
enhancing the WTO’s legitimacy and encouraging agreement on mid-level 
principles. 101 Of course, as Tractman suggests, the Appellate Body could also 
simply recognize the effect of such waivers without requiring any formal 
amendment.  
 
96 Williams, supra note 22. 
97 Scholte, supra note 7. 
98 Scholte, supra note 7 at 26. 
99 Bederman, supra note 24 at 180.  
100 Clarkson, supra note 4 at 260. 
101 Trachtman, supra note 14 at 89.   
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Although the conceptual underpinnings of contemporary international law 
are seen as rooted in inter-state agreement that derives its legitimacy from state 
sovereignty, the international system itself more commonly recognizes non-state 
actors and demonstrates increasing monist tendencies. Part of the problem is that “it 
is not clear that, for instance, government ministers at an OIC conference or 
technocrats in the World Bank Executive Board are particularly attuned to the needs 
and opinions of various non-state actors in their home countries”.102 Nonetheless, 
there seems to be a growing recognition that the WTO needs to be increasingly 
transparent and that international trade law is part of a broader system of 
international law, even though there is very little agreement on the full content of 
these principles and the full extent of their application.  
 
 
Perhaps this should not be surprising because states with radically different 
cultures and systems of governance can be expected to disagree on the essential 
nature of international governing bodies and their founding agreements. Portman, in 
his book on legal personality, discusses the relevance of broad legal principles to this 
theme in international law.  Drawing on Gallie’s work on “essentially contested 
concepts”, Portman argues that “there are certain concepts, for example, ‘fairness’ or 
‘justice’, the basic purpose of which might be agreed on but where there is no 
consensus on what they specifically entail”.103 The result is that “there are often 
social and indeed legal situations in which most participants agree that the concepts 
of ‘fairness’ or ‘justice’ are relevant, but where there are many different views on 
what exactly represents a ‘fair’ or ‘just’ solution.”104 Moreover, as Portman notes, 
conventional conceptions of international law founded on state sovereignty do not 
fully accord with existing international practice. If this is true, then perhaps it is more 
important to consider the relevance of international persons, as well as human rights 
and democratic norms, when interpreting and applying broad inter-state agreements 
such as those that delegate state power to the WTO.  This requires recognizing that 
“international law is not only particular or a mere decision-making process, but 
includes rules and principles of a general nature, and that factual developments do 
not have direct legal value, but have to be transformed into law through a principled 
justification”.105 As Beaulac maintains, this is a process that is essentially 
interpretative in nature:  
 
In an Anglo-Saxon common law system such as in Canada, the debate is 
not so much about the measures by which judicial activism may be tamed 
or controlled. As regards written law, traditionally approached 
102 Scholte, supra note 7 at 6. 
103 Portman, supra note 58 at 14. 
104  Ibid at 15. 
105 Ibid at 282.  
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restrictively, the issue has rather been how to prompt decision-makers to 
appreciate their role more in terms of collaborative participant in the 
pursuit of societal goals. The area of human rights protection was no doubt 
most apposite to a methodological paradigm shift, in favor of a substantive 
engagement to the realization and actualization of the law. In an era of 
globalization, as well as inter/supra/transnational governance, favoring 
open texture legal language to encourage and facilitate recourse to 
international normativity in the process of legal interpretation at the 
domestic level certainly constitutes a most effective strategy in promoting 
(not thwarting) rule of law values, both in the national and the 
international legal sphere.106 
 
 
What is interesting is that the interpretation of these agreements by national 
courts and WTO decision-making bodies themselves can be used to articulate an 
effective and principled compromise between these seemingly divergent norms.  
This does not mean insisting that “global governance is wrong in principle but it 
does suggest that a rebalancing of the current global institutions is urgently 
needed.”107 If we are to take seriously Clarkson’s claim that the provisions of these 
agreements have created a new external constitution for nations like Canada, it is 
important to consider their full nature and effect. Thus, rather than looking at the 
issue of compliance, the issues of coherence and integration in legal systems and the 
implications of incomplete integration for democratic values need to be considered.  
To this end, Sunstein has famously claimed that the incomplete theorization of 
constitutional law can be both useful and the product of a tacit social agreement. 
According to Sunstein, incomplete theorization of the law allows for decisions to be 
made more readily without the need to engage in protracted disagreement over 
principles and concepts that lie at the heart of the legal system.  Complete 
theorization is unnecessary, particularly at the early stages of system building, and 
rife with the potential for needless conflict.  Consequently, Sunstein stated the 
following about the place of disagreements in the constitutional realm:  
 
Constitutional disagreements have many legitimate sources. Two of these 
sources are especially important. First, people may share general 
commitments but disagree on particular outcomes. Second, people’s 
disagreements on general principles may produce disagreement over 
particular outcomes and low-level propositions as well. People who think 
that an autonomy principle accounts for freedom of speech may also think 
that the government cannot regulate truthful, non-deceptive commercial 
advertising—whereas people who think that freedom of speech is 
basically a democratic idea, and is focused on political speech, may have 
no interest in protecting commercial advertising at all. Constitutional 
theorizing can have a salutary function in part because it tests low-level 
principles by reference to more ambitious claims. Disagreements can be 
106 Beaulac, supra 31 at 484.  
107 Clarkson, supra note 84 at 25.  
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productive by virtue of this process of testing. 
Certainly if everyone having a reasonable general view converges on a 
particular (by hypothesis reasonable) judgment, nothing is amiss. But if an 
agreement is incompletely theorized, there is a risk that everyone who 
participates in the agreement is mistaken, and hence that the outcome is 
mistaken. There is also a risk that someone who is reasonable has not 
participated, and that if that person were included, the agreement would 
break down. Over time, incompletely theorized agreements should be 
subject to scrutiny and critique, at least in democratic arenas, and 
sometimes in courtrooms as well. That process may result in more 
ambitious thinking than constitutional law ordinarily entails.108 
  
 
 Incompletely theorized agreements must be first recognized as such and 
then become the object of further collective dialogue and critical scrutiny in order to 
build a more principled and formalized system. While many have argued that 
contemporary international law is moving towards a consensus-building model, and 
that international trade law is part of public international law, there is a distinct lack 
of discussion regarding the place of democratic norms within this integrated 
framework.  Widespread agreement on the importance of state sovereignty as a 
background assumption regarding the creation of supranational organizations such as 
the WTO has failed to consider the relevance of emerging democratic norms, as well 
as the general tendency towards inclusiveness and consultation that has been 
increasingly evident at the international level.  But, as Sunstein contends, this is not 
necessarily a barrier to progress: 
 
When people disagree or are uncertain about an abstract issue—is equality 
more important than liberty? does free will exist? is utilitarianism right? 
does punishment have retributive aims?—they can often make progress by 
moving to a level of greater particularity. They attempt a conceptual 
descent. This phenomenon has an especially notable feature: it enlists 
silence, on certain basic questions, as a device for producing convergence 
despite disagreement, uncertainty, limits of time and capacity, and 
heterogeneity. In short, silence can be a constructive force. Incompletely 
theorized agreements are an important source of successful 
constitutionalism and social stability; they also provide a way for people 
to demonstrate mutual respect.109 
 
Sunstein also says that where disagreement is intense, “full particularity” may be 
required; that is, the parties focus on results rather than theories or reasons since 
agreement on the former is more likely and can produce tangible results. In the case 
of trade advocates and human rights scholars, such a “conceptual descent” may be 
108 C Sunstein, “Incompletely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law” in Public Law and Legal 
Theory Working Paper Series {2007) online: University of Chicago Law School 
<http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html> at 20. 
109 Ibid at 2.  
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necessary if we are to create a truly balanced international constitutional order.  In 
Sunstein’s words, “when people diverge on some (relatively) high level proposition, 
they might be able to agree if they lower the level of abstraction”.110  As he notes, 
“what is critical is that they agree on how a case must come out and on a low-level 
justification”.111  
 
 
Sunstein’s theory, then, provides a conceptual model for the vertical and 
horizontal integration of human rights and international trade law. Seen in this light, 
the WTO Agreement is not itself an international trade constitution as much as it is 
part of a broader emerging unitary system of international law that includes 
conventional public international law, international human rights, and international 
trade law. Given that we can likely agree, all other things being equal, that trade is 
good and human rights are good, and that to date there has been relatively sparse 
progress made in terms of integrating human rights law and international trade law, 
there is room to propose a model of international legal harmonization using Sustein’s 
notion of incompletely theorized agreements. This implies two related but equally 
necessary projects: i) the creation of tangible legal and institutional practices that 
further integration in a practical sense; and ii) the opening of a legal dialogue where 
integration can be formalized through legal decisions, conventions, and treaties at 
both the domestic and international level.   
 
 
As Sunstein notes, agreement can often be reached by parties with radically 
differing views by promoting a principle of deference whereby “issues are resolved 
by reference to institutional competence, not on their merits”.112  Such a principle of 
deference roughly parallels the tendency of WTO Appellate Bodies to respect 
member autonomy by refraining from imposing damages or claiming any direct 
effect for its rulings, and by permitting exemptions for certain important interests, as 
provided for in Article XX of the GATT and highlighted in the traditional emphasis 
placed on state consent in giving rise to member obligations.  This leaves open the 
possibility of recognizing the “institutional competence” of national legislatures over 
issues relating to democratic interests and rights as well as the institutional 
competence of international bodies like the UN Commission on Human Rights.  
 
 
Sunstein provides us with a starting point to build coherence from above 
and below. There are many mechanisms within the WTO that can potentially effect 
integration provided the political will for consensus building and enhancing 
legitimization exists.   Regardless of whether we see these norms as preemptory 
110 Sunstein, supra note 15 at 1740-1741. 
111 Ibid at 1741. 
112 Sunstein, supra note 15 at 1747.  
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norms of international law within the meaning of Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, they, and other international human rights 
instruments, constitute “other rules of international law applicable in relations 
between the parties” that can be considered by the Dispute Settlement Body or the 
Appellate Body for the purposes of interpreting the treaty obligations under the 
WTO pursuant to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.113 Similarly, Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which 
governs the proper procedure to be followed by the parties and the Dispute 
Settlement Body in resolving disputes,114 provides: “The Members recognize that it 
serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered 
agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance 
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law”.115 
 
 
The WTO Appellate Body has shown a willingness to consider other 
international agreements. For example, in US—Shrimp Turtle, it noted the United 
States’ participation in the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and 
Conservation of Sea Turtles in its consideration of the application of Article XX of 
the GATT. Notably, the Appellate Body suggested that states should attempt to take 
other measures before imposing unilateral restraints on trade.116 Whether the 
Appellate Body or the Dispute Settlement Body would accept evidence of an 
international human rights obligation as a defence to a violation of a state’s 
obligations under the WTO Agreement, or as an exception under Article XX of the 
GATT or Article XIV of the GATS, remains to be seen.  There are, however, other 
means to legally justify the incorporation of democratic human rights into the WTO 
framework. In EC–Biotech, the WTO Panel Report noted that Article 31(3)(c) 
allowed it to take into account other treaties that applied to parties to a dispute when 
interpreting states’ respective WTO obligations.117 More generally, however, the 
WTO Panel Report voiced a reluctance to make determinations regarding the nature 
and extent of member obligations outside of the realm of WTO law.118   
 
 
113 A Blackett, “Mapping the Equilibrium Line: Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and the 
Interpretive Universe of the World Trade Organization” (2001) 65 Sask L Rev 369 at 377.  
114 Ibid.  
115 Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes (15 April 1994) online: World Trade Organization 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm#3> 
116 G Shaffer & J Trachtman, “WTO Judicial Interpretation” in A Narlikar, M Daunton & R.M. Stern, eds, 
The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organization (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 
541-42. 
117 Ibid at 544.  
118 Ibid at 546.  
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While the views of globalization advocates may be seen as shortsighted by 
those on the left, it is important to recognize that international trade law is founded 
on the principles of consensus building and state consent. Greater legitimacy and 
inclusiveness would likely create a more stable and robust international financial 
order, one that would seek to ameliorate longstanding tensions between developing 
nations and the western world.  As Sunstein notes, “Through both analogies and 
rules, it is often possible for participants in constitutional law to converge on both 
abstract principles and particular outcomes without resolving large-scale issues of 
the right or the good.”119 The WTO has already shown an increased tendency toward 
greater transparency and deference to the policy-making decisions of individual 
states.  However, if a more comprehensive degree of integration at the public 
international level is to occur, the WTO must consider a practical means of allowing 
greater participation by other international organizations and localized interests. 
Likewise, integrative efforts must also occur at the domestic level as part of the 
process of formulating a broader civic awareness, which is essential to building a 
more effective international legal regime.  Convergence, in this case, may require 
human rights scholars to consider practical ways in which transparency, 
accountability, and representativeness may be enhanced, while experts in 
international trade consider how theoretical concerns about integration and popular 
sovereignty can be addressed as a means of enhancing the legitimacy of the WTO.  
 
 
Justiciable Norms and the Role of Deference  
 
The complexity of the integration problem is compounded by what one might call 
the degree of fit between democratic principles and the lack of popular consultation 
that has historically been characteristic of multilateral conventions, like the WTO 
Treaty, entered into by nation states. What is the test of legitimacy for agreements or 
customary norms entered into by nation states that seek to abdicate areas of popular 
sovereignty?  Are there any minimum standards of transparency and popular choice 
that apply to the law-making activities of nation states at the international level when 
those same activities can be applied at the domestic level? This is of particular 
concern when such norms have not been debated or fully and properly considered 
within nation states. In the absence of a more concerted and principled search for 
democratic integration there is a risk that integration will be imposed from above by 
a very narrow and self-interested set of international actors and their local proxies. 
Despite the fact that WTO bodies have shown themselves as subject to political 
pressure, Krikorian raises the intriguing possibility that “we are witnessing a shift in 
the nature of international law whereby a form of judicial review is now being 
undertaken at the international level”.120  
 
119 Sunstein, supra note 108 at 7. 
120 Krikorian, supra note 44 at 218.  
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Is part of the problem perhaps that neither monism nor dualism are 
particularly tenable theories in light of the blurring of jurisdictional boundaries 
within today’s rapidly globalizing world? Cottier insists that we have long moved 
beyond a simple dichotomy between monist and dualist models of international law 
towards what he terms “an emerging doctrine of multilayered governance”. For this 
reason, legal questions involving the intersection of domestic and international law 
cannot be solved simply by traditional methods that often failed to adequately 
consider the complex interrelationship between domestic interests and international 
law. Perhaps it is more practical in the long run to simply focus on the type of 
problem before us, whether it is indeed a legal problem, and the types of tools and 
principles that we have at our disposal to solve it.  In this vein, Cottier instead urges 
that problems related to the intersection of domestic and WTO law be solved by 
determining whether: i) it is a political question that does not involve legal principles 
and norms; ii) the question is justiciable, involving a legal matter or issues related to 
legal principles best solved by courts; and iii) it is a matter that requires judicial 
restraint or deference depending on the degree to which democratic bodies are 
involved or the level and nature of expertise required. Moving beyond the traditional 
monist-dualist dichotomy requires focusing on situating legal norms within the 
context of real life disputes that they may help resolve:  
 
The notion of law cannot be divided. It is conceptually outdated to 
question the legal nature of international law, and in particular of WTO 
law in light of existing mechanisms of international dispute settlement and 
enforcement of WTO law. No longer are Austinian and positivist doubts 
appropriate. Instead, the body of law needs to be considered as a whole, 
and it is a matter of defining the mutual relationship between different 
sources and layers of regulation in defining primacy and the effect of 
norms. This is the essence of an emerging doctrine of multilayered 
governance, seeking to establish a proper balance between international 
and domestic law. Within this concept, norms—whatever the layer of 
governance—may be of a programmatic nature, calling upon the legislator 
for implementation and barring direct effect. Such norms may be found in 
international law and in constitutional law alike. They may also be found 
in legislation. At the same time, other norms are suitable for direct effect, 
again independently of whether they belong to the realm of international 
or domestic law. Whether or not a norm is of such a quality depends on 
what we call the doctrine of justiciability.  
Courts need to ask whether the norm is justiciable—whether, in 
other words, it is suitable for judicial decision-making. Courts can refer to 
criteria in assessing whether the matter pertains to their province or not. 
These criteria not only include the textual clarity and precision of a rule, 
whether it allocates rights and obligations, but mainly whether it is 
suitable for judicial application, concretization, and refinement in case 
law. The matter before the court must be apt to be assessed by the court, 
and a decision taken suitable to be implemented without further 
legislation…In assessing justiciabilty, the implications of a ruling on the 
allocation and balance of powers within a constitutional framework thus  
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play an important role. These considerations are today often taken into 
account silently and implied in reasons given to deny direct effect. They 
need, however, to be discussed in explicit terms. Separations of powers 
and checks and balances form an important ingredient of judicial 
reasoning in assessing justiciability. A political question doctrine and a 
doctrine of judicial restraint offer appropriate rationales.121 
 
Such a model, then, envisions a more active role for domestic courts in determining 
the exact inter-relationship between WTO rules and rulings and domestic law. 
Cottier also suggests that the extent of direct application is a matter which should be 
explicitly stated within the WTO Agreements themselves, along with any future 
amendments, and cited Article XX of the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement as an example. Finally, Cottier recommends allowing private citizens 
access to WTO law within their own domestic legal systems. While this does appear 
to be a step towards enhanced openness and fairness in the relationship between 
domestic and international legal trading systems, it is difficult to see how many of 
the problems regarding legitimacy are resolved by direct effect if the current 
democratic deficit within the existing regime is not resolved and if such rules are not 
negotiated in an open and democratic manner from the outset.   
 
 
If domestic integration is to become a reality, much work remains to be 
done as the focus begins to shift to forging incompletely theorized agreements that 
incorporate democratic rights and formalizing existing democratic rules and 
institutional structures. Despite Canadian courts’ long history of using international 
case law and conventions to interpret domestic law, despite that it can be reasonably 
claimed that the WTO Agreement constitutes part of Canada’s “external 
constitution”,122 and despite the relatively “open texture” of much of the language 
surrounding WTO enabling statutes and decisions,123 there is a remarkable lack of 
judicial deliberation regarding their legal nature and effect. A primary issue perhaps 
is our collective failure to see international trade law as far more than a technical 
realm beyond the comprehension or concern of ordinary citizens. As Bederman 
states, “there is thus a subtle interplay between fairness, humanity and democracy as 
values in international law”.124 Indeed, “the combination of these principles has 
offered a powerful philosophic alternative to State-centered objectives of peace, 
order and sovereignty”.125 This is a question that is ultimately related to education 
121  T Cottier, “The role of domestic courts in the implementation of WTO Law: The Poltical economy of 
separation of powers and checks and balances in international trade regulation” in A. Narlikar, M. 
Daunton & R.M. Stern, eds. The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organization (Oxford, U.K.: 
Oxford University Press, 2012) at 623-624. 
122 See Clarkson, supra note 84. 
123 Beaulac, supra note 31. 
124 Bederman, supra note 24 at 198.  
125 Ibid at 199.   
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and the need to cultivate a deeper public understanding of the WTO’s proper role, a 
project that is closely related to the WTO’s legitimacy.126  While the WTO’s role as 
an instrument of active policy-making and dispute mediation is well understood, its 
real importance lies in its law-making capacity.  According to Cho, this requires a 
“didactic approach” in order to ensure that “the gravitational force of international 
trade law can be better absorbed in the domestic legal system” as more people 
become “norm entrepreneurs”.127 
 
 
In many respects this international democratic deficit highlights the 
importance of creating a broader and more representative global public sphere, but 
one in which individuals become active and critical citizens. The issue of legitimacy 
is one that is related to education and the global public’s knowledge of the WTO and 
their ability to lobby for effective state action.128  However, legitimacy is also related 
to the organization’s ability to reflect and embody fundamental international 
democratic norms. Widespread discomfort about the aims of the WTO underscore 
the need for more representative global institutions that are characterized by 
enhanced transparency, and a heightened role for NGOs and citizens alike within an 
emerging global public sphere. Creating a more inclusive international legal order 
requires moving beyond “the breathless rhetoric of free market rationality” towards 
the search to create, on a global scale, “those noncommodified public spheres that 
serve as the repository for critical education, language, and public intervention”.129 
While this is a difficult task, it is not an impossible one, provided that it is coupled 
with a more comprehensive civic literacy in which global citizens are informed about 
the complex dynamic that exists between nation states, corporations, and 
international organizations within a rapidly changing world.   
 
 
To return to Schwartz’s comment, if we are indeed talking about an 
emerging international constitution, it remains incompletely theorized and perhaps 
necessarily so. Both trade and democracy are important ends, but we can no longer 
afford to have each pursued in such stark isolation. As Clarkson has well argued, 
concrete particularity is needed while we continue to articulate emerging principles 
and more formalized ground rules that effectively balance the practical requirements 
of popular sovereignty with the demands of free trade. Extreme rhetoric on both the 
right and left will only deepen the divide at the cost of lost opportunities and, 
possibly, a new global social contract that is less utopian than the gradual product of 
a principled pragmatism that remains preoccupied with the messy business of forging 
an enduring compromise. This is a political project that has law at its core and that 
126 S Cho, “A Quest for WTO’s legitimacy” (2005) 4 World Trade Review. 3, 391-399.  
127 Ibid at 399. 
128 Clarkson, supra note 4 at 263.   
129 Giroux & Giroux, supra note 83 at 24.   
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seeks to formalize a gradually expanding network of tacit and ad hoc agreements 
into a global system that makes allowance for democracy, trade, and human rights. It 
is a difficult but possible task, provided we remain focused on the dangers of 
partisanship in a world that is rapidly becoming increasingly polarized and devoid of 
any deep and lasting social commitments.  
 
 
HARMONIZATION AS DEMOCRATIC COMPROMISE? 
 
What would a harmonized model that integrates democratic norms and trade 
liberalization look like? As Scholte emphasizes, “today no regulatory body—
including a state—constructs public policy on its own. Global institutions, regional 
agencies, state bodies and substate authorities are embedded together in a host of 
polycentric networks that operate in respect of different policy issues”.130  Whereas 
Sunstein promotes incomplete theorization as a tacit agreement to neglect 
articulating a comprehensive theorization of the law, there is an opposite problem 
here. International law is viewed as something that is fundamentally outside of the 
Canadian legal system and that is acknowledged or incorporated by the judiciary or 
the legislature in an ad hoc and unprincipled manner.  The type of harmonization 
described by Bastarache needs to be informed by a new democratic realism that can 
act as a force for change within both domestic nation states and supra-national 
organizations alike.  The evolving reality of public international law requires a 
change in the way domestic law and international trade law intersect. The 
conventional dualist model and the traditional emphasis upon state consent fails to 
reflect emerging democratic norms and the broader question of institutional 
legitimacy at international law. In Sunstein’s words, “legitimacy stems not simply 
from principled consistency on the part of adjudicators (or someone else) but from a 
justifiable exercise of public force. That theory should be founded on a theory of 
authority and hence (if we are democrats) in suitably constrained democratic 
considerations”.131 
 
 
There are also measures that can clearly be taken to enhance democratic 
norms within the WTO framework itself, leaving room for consensus building by 
nations that are eager to enhance the legitimacy of the WTO system. As Loy 
suggests, measures such as increasing the public visibility of the dispute resolution 
process and permitting the participation of NGOs and allowing them to submit 
amicus curiae briefs are likely also steps in the right direction.  Experts on 
international human rights jurisprudence could also be consulted pursuant to Article 
13.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, Article 11(2) of the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), and Article 14 of the 
130  Scholte, supra note 7 at 19. 
131 Sunstein, supra note 15 at 1763.  
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Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).132 For example, Article IX:2 of 
the WTO Agreement allows member states to adopt interpretations of WTO 
provisions by a three-fourths majority,133 which leaves room for provisions that 
explicitly reference international human rights instruments or the importance of 
democratic principles.  Similar measures can be taken through the amending 
provisions of Article X,134 mentioned above, or simply through the recommendations 
of working groups and internal committees.  Such a process of formalizing implicit 
norms can not only animate effective compromise in the international sphere, but 
also reflect important democratic principles at play within the nation state, including 
chiefly that of popular sovereignty and the right of self determination.  Harrington 
maintains that there are also distinct changes that can be made to address a broader 
democratic deficit that exists within all Commonwealth democracies, including 
Canada:  
 
A multipartisan federal parliamentary committee specifically dedicated to 
the task of treaty scrutiny is the best means to achieve both public 
awareness and improved democratic accountability in the field of treaty 
making. A treaty committee focuses public attention on treaty making, 
dispels any myths and uncovers matters needing further investigation, and 
also provides a public repository for treaty information. Such a committee, 
however, must be established with the support of the government in power 
since the committee will need the co-operation of its ministers and 
officials. It must also be of an adequate size if it is to follow Australia’s 
lead and carry out hearings beyond the confines of the capital, and it must 
be supported by an adequate secretariat to assist with the development of a 
corporate memory and a fruitful relationship with civil society groups, 
industry leaders, academic, and other non-governmental organizations.  
As for the need for parliamentary approval for treaty action, 
whether federal or regional, it is my view that the treaty-making process 
must allow for the possibility that a state will not ratify a treaty following 
an expression of parliamentary disapproval. All treaties need not be 
expressly approved by Parliament, but there should be a mechanism that 
enables Parliament to draw attention to a future treaty action that has 
strong opposition, and this mechanism should not rest on the goodwill or 
discretion of the executive branch…I can hardly see the expansion of this 
legal fetter on the prerogative power of the Crown causing any great harm. 
A negative resolution procedure applicable to treaties after signature but 
before ratification will not unduly tie the hands of the executive during 
treaty negotiation, and may foster a greater degree of consultation, and 
even co-operation, between the levels and branches of government at the 
132 F Loy, “Public Participation in the World Trade Organization” in G P Sampson, ed. The Role of the 
World Trade Organization in Global Governance (New York, U.S.A.: United Nations University Press, 
2001) at 129. 
133 Mavroidis, supra note 34 at 429. 
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pre-signature stage. It is also a middle ground position that balances the 
various interests at play.135 
 
 
 While these types of practical measures are promising, they also rely on a 
widespread recognition of the vital national interests at play and the failure of the 
present regime to protect the interests of Canadian democracy. Interestingly, 
Harrington also sees an expanded role for the Courts in bridging the democratic 
deficit caused by the usual lack of consultation between the executive and the 
legislative branches of most Western nations:  
 
A final impetus for securing a greater role for the elected legislature in the 
making of treaties comes from the domestic courts. No longer is it 
‘elementary’, to use the words of Lord Denning, ‘that these courts take no 
notice of treaties as such…until they are embodied in laws enacted by 
Parliament, and then only to the extent that Parliament tells us’. Our 
common law courts are increasingly finding ways to give unincorporated 
treaties domestic legal significance, it not domestic effect, and for this 
reason too, I support a greater role for Parliament, whether federal, state, 
provincial or devolved, in the making of treaties. The resulting public 
record of Parliament’s involvement prior to ratification could serve to 
either counterbalance the activism of the courts when Parliament is against 
giving domestic effect to a treaty, or bolster the decision of the courts by 
providing evidence of Parliament’s support for a treaty’s provisions. In 
any event, a parliamentary role in treaty making is necessary to avoid 
engaging the nation in long standing legal commitments without public 
scrutiny and debate.136   
 
 
While there may not be a customary international norm in favor of 
democratic governance, it is worth considering the relevance and potential effect of 
an emerging norm in interpreting a post-Statist international legal framework. As 
Bederman states, “in reality, it may just be that we are changing our notions of State 
sovereignty to accommodate the new realities of non-State actors and diverse sources 
of international law-making authority and enforcement”.137 For judiciaries and 
legislatures, the key question remains one of constitutional integrity: whether the 
statutes implementing international treaty obligations are in fact constitutional and 
democratic, and whether international human rights conventions and preemptory 
norms are properly respected. Although supranational trade organizations do exhibit 
an increasing willingness to take international law into consideration, there remains a 
disturbing tendency to ignore the close connection that exists between economic 
equality, social justice, and democratic legitimacy.  More important, perhaps, is the 
135 Harrington, supra note 12 at 509.  
136 Ibid. 
137 Bederman, supra note 24 at 157.   
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need to create a broader system of public international law that embodies what 
Marks calls “the principle of democratic inclusion”, whereby “democracy is seen to 
entail not only a particular set of institutions and procedures, but also, and more 
generally, an ongoing call to enlarge the opportunities for popular participation in 
political processes and end social practices that systematically marginalize some 
citizens while empowering others”.138  
 
 
As a whole then, the present situation is unsatisfactory for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, it leaves much of the day-to-day work of conceptualizing 
international law to the executive, its administrative apparatus, and the political 
interests that often drive international deal making. Furthermore, an increasing 
number of international treaties dealing with trade and intellectual property rights are 
much more explicit about their integration into domestic legal systems and have 
created organizational systems in order to ensure their full implementation. The 
existing rights regime lacks a comparable degree of organizational efficiency and is 
much less explicit about integration, raising the danger that one area of international 
law will have a proportionately larger degree of domestic influence. The Canadian 
judiciary has failed to adequately theorize and relate democratic principles regarding 
constitutional supremacy and popular sovereignty to international law, meaning that 
international trade organizations have applied far-reaching rules and regulations to 
our domestic legal system with no sense of the unique legal culture, or the particular 
democratic traditions, of the nation in which these rules are applied.  In the absence 
of human rights advocacy and popular dialogue, expedience breeds injustice and 
oversight to the detriment of global democracy.  Quite simply, this must change.  
 
 
138 Marks, supra note 86 at 109.                                                          
